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THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE:
AN OVERVIEW
JON R. WALTZ*
On January 2, 1975, President Gerald Ford signed into law the final
version of House Bill 5463, which then became Public Law 93-595 and
which in accordance with rule 1103 contained in the new statute will hence-
forward be known as the Federal Rules of Evidence.' Officially, these rules
went into effect on July 1, 1975; unofficially the federal courts, including the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, were giving persuasive effect to
the rules well before their effective date.2 There can be little question that
adoption of the Rules of Evidence is the most significant development in fed-
eral practice since the approval in 1938 of -the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. And adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence by the states, with
some necessary modifications, is already underway.3
HISTORY
The Federal Rules of Evidence rode a rougher path to approval than
did the Rules of Civil Procedure, which went into effect without significant
congressional demurrer. In a negative sense, the history of the new federal
code of evidence goes back to April, 1937, when the United States Supreme
Court's original Advisory Committee on Civil Rules stated in a note appended
to what became Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43, dealing with the taking
of testimony during trials, that "[tlhe first impression of the Committee was
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Distinguished Visit-
ing Professor of Law, IIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law, Summer, 1974; member of
the Ohio and Illinois Bars; J.D., Yale Law School.
Portions of this article are drawn from Professor Waltz's book, THn FEDEA. RuLEs
OF EVIDENCE: AN ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1975).
1. 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
2. E.g., United States v. Banks, 520 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1975) (rule 601, witness
competency); United States v. Farris, 517 F.2d 226 (7th Cir. 1975) (rules 803(6), (7),
(8), (9) and (10), 902 and 1005, self-authentication of officially certified computer data
compilations); Levitt v. H.J. Jeffries, Inc., 517 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1975) (rule 401, defi-
nition of "relevant" evidence); Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974)
(rule 103(a) (2), offers of proof).
3. See, e.g., Smith & Ehrhardt, Proposed Code of Evidence, 48 FLA. B.J. 13
(1974); ADvisoRY CoMMrrrE, TENTATIVE DRAFT, MAINE RuLEs OF EVIDENCE (1974);
Symposium, Proposals for a New York Code of Evidence, 19 N.Y.L.F. 739 (1974); Pro-
posed Nebraska Rules of Evidence: A Symposium, 53 NEB. L REv. 331 (1974); NEv.
REV. STAT. tit. 4, ch. 47-52 (1971); NEW MEXaCO STAT. ch. 20, art. 4 (Supp. 1973);
WISC. STAT. ANN. tit. XLIV-A, ch. 901-11 (1975).
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against touching the field of evidence.' 4 And in large measure the Commit-
tee governed itself by this initial impression: it touched upon evidentiary
matters in only two of the procedural rules that it drafted. 5
A year later the Advisory Committee's chairman, former Attorney
General William D. Mitchell, suggested that "some day, some other advisory
committee should tackle the task of revising the rules of evidence and com-
posing them into a new set of rules to be promulgated by the Supreme
Court." 6 During the next twenty years the American Bar Association and
other lawyers' groups pressed for the formulation of uniform rules of evidence
applicable to actions tried in the United States District Courts. In 1961 the
Judicial Conference of the United States gave its approval to a proposal that
it proceed with a project for a federal code of evidence.7 A special commit-
tee, headed by Professor James William Moore of the Yale Law School,
reported during the following year that such a project was both advisable and
feasible.8
Within three years an Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence had
been assembled. The Committee was heavily weighted with practitioners
either actively engaged in the trial of cases or closely associated with that
activity. Albert E. Jenner, Jr., the noted Chicago trial lawyer, was the
fifteen-member Committee's chairman; eight other members were practi-
tioners; three were federal judges; three were law teachers. 9
On January 30, 1969, Mr. Jenner formally transmitted a Preliminary
Draft of Rules of Evidence to Judge Albert B. Maris, Chairman of the Stand-
ing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence. The Preliminary Draft was then circulated to the entire bench and bar
with the Conference's request for comments and suggestions. Discussions of
the 1969 Preliminary Draft were held at each of the 1969 Circuit Judicial
Conferences and five two-day, multi-state regional seminars were conducted
with members of the Advisory Committee in attendance. Numerous individual
judges and practitioners presented constructive criticism of the Preliminary
4. REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES SuPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE (1937), quoted in Cleary, The Plan for the Adoption of
Rules of Evidence for United States District Courts, 25 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 142
(1970).
5. Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
6. PROCEEDINGS, INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES (CLEVELAND) 186 (1938).
7. 30 F.R.D. 73 (1962).
8. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161, 179 (1969).
9. The other fourteen members of the Advisory Committee were David Berger,
Esq.; Hicks Epten, Esq.; Robert Erdahl, Esq.; Judge Joe Ewing Estes; Prof. Thomas F.
Green, Jr.; Egbert L. Hayward, Esq.; Dean Charles W. Joiner; Frank G. Raichle, Esq.;
Herman F. Selvin, Esq.; Judge Simon E. Sobeloff; Craig Spangenberg, Esq.; Judge Rob-
ert Van Pelt; Prof. Jack B. Weinstein; and Edward Bennett Williams, Esq. Both Dean
Joiner and Prof. Weinstein were appointed to the federal bench subsequent to the Advis-
ory Committee's formation.
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Draft and suggestions for amendment. Many of these suggestions were later
adopted, in whole or in part, by the Advisory Committee before the 1971
Revised Draft of the Rules was formally submitted by the Judicial Conference
to the Supreme Court in its 1971 Term.10
On November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court promulgated the Federal
Rules of Evidence pursuant to the various pertinent Enabling Acts."
According to the order of promulgation, the new rules were to take effect
on July 1, 1973, unless disapproved by Congress. On February 5, 1973,
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, acting under the Court's November 20,
1972, promulgation order, 12 formally transmitted the Proposed Rules of Evi-
dence to Congress. At this juncture, comparison of the transmitted draft with
the 1971 Revised Draft revealed some redrafting that had not previously
been made public. Most of the redrafting was of rules bearing upon criminal
matters. Nine of the seventy-seven Proposed Rules had been changed by
the Judicial Conference at the request of the Kleindienst Justice Department
after the dealine for public examination of and comment on revisions had
expired. 13
Influential members of Congress were displeased with the Supreme
Court's inclusion of a date on which the rules would automatically become
effective in the absence of congressional disapproval. 14 Hitting back at what
it considered to be the Court's highhandedness, Congress passed Public Law
93-12, which deferred the effectiveness of the rules until such time as they
might be expressly approved by Congress.' 5
Thereafter the Proposed Rules were assigned to a subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee, which held six days of public hearings.'0 In
June, 1973, the subcommittee published and circulated a print. of its product,
House Bill 5463.17 This bill was approved by the full judiciary committee and
on February 6, 1974, it passed in the House. The bill contained numerous
amendments of the Rules as transmitted by the Supreme Court.
House Bill 5463 was next referred to the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary. This committee focused on the House bill rather than on the Court's
10. REVISED DRAFT, PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
11. Order, 56 F.R.D. 184 (1972). See also Rules of Evidence for United States
Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 194 (1972).
12. See 56 F.R.D. 184 (1972).
13. See J. WALTZ, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: AN ANALYSIS viii (2d ed.
1975).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 52, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973).
15. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
16. See Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws of the Comm. on the Judiciary-House of Representatives on Proposed Rules of
Evidence, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2 (1973).
17. SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d
CONG., 1ST SESS., PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE (Comm. Print 1973).
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transmitted version of the Rules. It made a substantial number of additional
amendments before publishing its report on October 18, 1974.18 On Decem-
ber 14, 1974, the Senate-House Committee of Conference reported its resolu-
tion of the variations between the Senate and House versions of the rules.
19
The Conference report, incorporating a number of new amendments, was
agreed to by the Senate on December 16, 1974,20 and in the House on
December 18.21 In the chaotic last days of the 93rd Congress, the final ver-
sion of House Bill 5463 was not printed. It was, however, signed by
President Ford early in the following month. 22
It is accurate to say that the rules ultimately approved by Congress and
signed into law by the President are essentially the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court, with some important exceptions dictated in the main by Con-
gress' disagreement with the Advisory Committee's assessment of the signifi-
cance of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,23 and, regrettably, with a few
vexing drafting errors.
The work of the Court's Advisory Committee and of the two congres-
sional subcommittees had fallen into three categories: (1) the codification
and occasional clarification of relatively settled evidentiary principles and
practices; (2) the resolution of conflicting evidentiary approaches where such
differences should be discerned; and (3) the making of some innovations,
either moving beyond or backing away from established principles.
As the Advisory Committee itself freely conceded, no sharply defined
pattern emerges from its extended labors and the amendments of Congress
superimposed no pattern on the Advisory Committee's product. This much
can be said: although both the Advisory Committee and Congress refused
to voice a generalized preference for the admission of evidence, whenever
there was a close choice between exclusion and admissibility, the drafters of
the new Federal Rules of Evidence chose the latter. 24 The philosophy that
emerges is that, in general, cases should be decided on the basis of received
18. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
19. H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
20. 120 CONG. REC. S21,644-45 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1974).
21. 120 CONG. REC. H12,253-60 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974).
22. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESiDENTuL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 11, No. 1 at 12
(Jan. 6, 1975).
23. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The decision in the most important of Erie's progeny,
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), was handed down after the Advisory Commit-
tee's formation but prior to its first meeting. It was the Committee's view, obviously
shared by the Court which appointed it, that Hanna left the Committee free, within the
bounds of the Enabling Acts, to recommend for promulgation uniform rules of evidence.
At first the Advisory Committee thought that only burdens of proof would be subject
to Erie's command concerning the applicability of state law in diversity of citizenship
cases; later the Committee developed an identical attitude toward presumptions. Still
later the Congress concluded that Erie's dictates were applicable to privileges and to
witness competency.
24. See generally statement of Frank Raichle, Esq., a member of the Advisory
Committee, 48 F.R.D. 52 (1969).
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rather than excluded evidence. The process of evidentiary innovation and
the philosophy just mentioned are both observable in a number of the rules
singled out for special mention in this article.
OVERVIEW
What follows is a catalog of the most significant aspects of the new
Federal Rules of Evidence, now applicable in all federal courts. The Rules
are set up in eleven articles, some of which, like Article V (Privileges) are
very brief and some of which, like Article VIII (Hearsay) are lengthy,
complicated, and full of innovations.
Article I: General Provisions
The initial article embraces, among other subjects: rulings on evidence;
offers of proof; 25 the "plain error" rule; the handling of evidence admissible
for a limited purpose only; and the "completeness rule" relating to writings.
Rule 104 attempts to clarify the respective functions of judge and jury, and
the applicability of evidentiary rules, in the disposition of preliminary ques-
tions of admissibility. Nothing in this general article constitutes a notable
departure from past practice in the Seventh Circuit.
As submitted to Congress by the Supreme Court, rule 105 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence permitted trial judges to "fairly and impartially
sum up the evidence and comment to the jury upon the weight of the evi-
dence and the credibility of witnesses."'26  The quoted language stated the
current rule, although not the invariable practice, in the federal courts. It
was close, at least in theory, to the English approach, which gives the trial
judge wide latitude in commenting on the evidence. 27
The House Judiciary Committee recognized that the rule as submitted
was consistent with current federal practice. 28  Even so, the aspect of the
rule dealing with the authority of a trial judge to comment on the weight
of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, as distinguished from that
aspect of the rule that dealt with summing up or marshalling evidence, was
25. Because Rule 103 (a) has to do with the preservation for appeal of claimed er-
ror in trial level rulings on evidence, subdivision (a) (2) in no way relates to the sort
of offer of proof that is sometimes made by counsel prior to any in-court testimony and
thus obviously prior to any objection and ruling. This latter sort of offer, which is not
precluded by Rule 103 (a) (2), may be made because offering counsel has a number of
witnesses, who are available but not present in court, to establish a line of facts but the
trial judge's rulings or comments have strongly suggested that he would exclude their
testimony. Such an offer may also be made, even as early as a pretrial conference, to
induce a ruling on a line of facts. For a detailed discussion of offers of proof in the
federal practice, see Waltz, Making the Record, in D. LoUISELL, J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ,
CASES AND MAmRmIs ON EVIDENCE 1316-1326 (2d ed. 1972).
26. 51 F.R.D. 315, 328 (1971).
27. See J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, THE TRIAL OF JACK Ruly 304-05 (1965).
28. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973).
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controversial. After inconclusive debate, the judiciary committee deleted the
entire -rule. In doing so, however, it announced that it intended that "its
action be understood as reflecting no conclusion as to the merits of the pro-
posed Rule."' 29  The committee stated that it was leaving the subject for
separate consideration at some future time. Neither the full House of Rep-
resentatives nor the Senate resurrected the subject and so the Federal Rules
of Evidence as approved by Congress contain no rule relating to summing
up and commenting on evidence and credibility. Thus the local practice of
the district courts will continue undisturbed, at least until such time as Con-
gress reconsiders the issue.
Article II: Judicial Notice
Rule 201(a) specifically states that article II, delineating the formal
procedures and limitations applicable to judicial notice, governs only judicial
notice of adjudicative facts, that is, the facts of the particular case, and thus
does not control judicial notice of so-called legislative facts, that is, general
facts which help a court to determine the content of the law and of policy
and aid it in exercising judgment or discretion (for example, citing the works
of economists and sociologists in school desegregation cases),3 0 and article II
does not deal with judicial notice of foreign law, a subject left to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 and rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. In its treatment of judicial notice of adjudicative facts, article
II conforms to past practice in the federal courts.
Article III: Presumptions
This article is limited to civil actions and proceedings; it does not deal
with the effect of presumptions in criminal cases.3 ' The effect of rule 301
is to make it clear that while evidence of underlying facts giving rise to a pre-
sumption shifts to the opposing side the burden of going forward with evi-
dence, the purpose of which is to meet or rebut the presumption, it does not
alter the burden of persuasion as to the existence of the presumed fact. The
burden of persuasion remains with the litigant to which it was allocated in
the first instance.
Article IV: Relevancy and Its Limits
Rule 401 defines the standard of relevancy as being evidence's tendency
to make the existence of a fact more probable, or less probable, than it would
29. Id.
30. The distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts is drawn clearly in
a classic article, Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 H~Av. L. REv. 364, 404-07 (1942).
31. The matter of presumptions in criminal cases is being considered in connection
with pending bills to revise the federal criminal code.
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be without that evidence.8 2 Rule 402 explicitly declines to codify statutory
and constitutional limitations on admissibility. With some exceptions, rule
404 rejects character evidence as circumstantial evidence. Rule 405 recog-
nizes the admissibility of opinion evidence, along with reports of reputation,
to establish character where character evidence is permissible. Rule 406, in
a departure from Illinois practice, 33 permits the receipt of evidence of habit
and routine, whether or not corroborated and regardless of the presence of
eyewitnesses. Rule 407 states the usual rule relating to post-accident
remedial measures: inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct but
admissible for impeachment or on contested issues of ownership, control, or
feasibility of safety measures. Rule 408 extends the rule against receipt of
offers of compromise to include statements made during preliminary compro-
mise negotiations.
Article V: Privileges
Rule 501, the only rule contained in the fifth article, provides that in
federal criminal cases and in federal question civil cases, federally evolved
rules of privilege are to be applied since it is federal policies that are being
enforced in these two areas of litigation.8 4 Conversely, where state substan-
tive law supplies the rule of decision, state rules of privilege are to be applied
in all but the most exceptional situations.
Article VI: Witnesses
Rule 601 was amended in the House of Representatives and in the
Senate to conform with rule 501. In cases in which state substantive
law supplies the rule of decision, state rules concerning competency of
witnesses to testify are to be applied. The effect of the amendatory language
is to make Dead Man's Acts applicable in diversity cases, much to the regret
of many lawyers who regard these statutes as an abomination. 8
Article VI does not specify any mental or moral qualifications of
witnesses. The fundamental requirement, laid down in rule 602, is that wit-
32. The Seventh Circuit tacitly approved this definition, citing Proposed Rule 401,
in Levitt v. H.J. Jeffries, Inc., 517 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1975).
33. See, e.g., Pellico v. Jackson, 70 Ill. App. 2d 313, 217 N.E.2d 281 (1966).
34. The federal courts in federal question civil cases and in federal criminal prose-
cutions-in which privilege law is to "be governed by the principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience"-are quite likely to follow, with little modification, the privilege formula-
tions set forth in the Supreme Court's proposed but congressionally rejected article V.
REVISED DRAFT, PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES, 51 F.R.D. 315, 356-83 (1971). For detailed discussion of the nine privi-
lege rules contained in the Proposed Rules, see J. WALTZ, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVI-
DENCE: AN ANALYSIS 39-80 (2d ed. 1975).
35. For a powerful criticism of the Dead Man's Acts, see Ladd, Witnesses, 10 RUT-
GERS L. REV. 523, 525-26 (1956).
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nesses must have personal knowledge of matters about which they offer to
give testimony. s6 And interest, perceptual and memory defects, convictions
of serious crimes, and other matters bearing on credibility may be used to
impeach a witness' credibility in the eyes of judge or jury.
Under Rule 606, a juror cannot testify about mental processes or
emotions affecting his or her or any other juror's verdict and cannot testify
about irregularities occurring inside the jury's deliberation room. A juror
can, however, testify to the fact of improper outside influences. s7
Rule 607 jettisons whatever remains of the traditional -rule against
impeaching one's own witness. Methods of impeachment are clarified in
rules 608 through 613. After some wavering back and forth, rule 609 con-
tinues the principle that, generally speaking, an accused and an ordinary
witness can be impeached by evidence of prior conviction of any sort of
felony, not just those involving dishonesty or false statement.
Rule 611(b) retains but brings some flexibility to the rule that cross-
examination should be restricted to the scope of the preceding direct
examination.38
In the form in which it was submitted to Congress, rule 612, detailing
procedures to be employed in using writings to refresh or revive present recol-
lection, was in basic accord with settled doctrine but did contain one innova-
tion. Past case law had failed, in the main, to recognize any right of access
by the opponent when a memory-refreshing writing was used prior to the time
the witness got on the stand. This distinction has more recently been under-
going partial repudiation.3 9  Rule 612, as submitted to Congress, did away
with the distinction completely by referring to use "either before or while tes-
tifying." The House Judiciary Committee amended the Court's proposed rule
612 and the Senate concurred. The resulting rule still requires the produc-
tion of writings used by a witness while he is on the stand testifying but makes
the required production of memory-refreshing writings used prior to taking
the stand a matter of judicial discretion rather than an absolute right. This dis-
cretionary approach will permit judges to block fishing expeditions among the
numerous papers which a witness may have consulted before going on the
stand.
36. Note that a witness can have personal knowledge of a hearsay statement and
thus can testify to the fact that such a statement was made. However, article VIII gov-
erning hearsay will then determine whether the statement is admissible in evidence.
37. Rule 606 is likely to undergo reconsideration when some court, citing the rule,
rejects evidence that a gun-wielding juror threatened to kill any fellow juror who failed
to acquiesce in his or her views. Under rule 606, this would be a "matter ... occurring
during the course of the jury's deliberations" and would be inadmissible to impeach the
jury's verdict.
38. Under this rule, the trial judge, in the exercise of discretion, can permit inquiry
into additional matters but examining counsel must proceed "as if on direct examina-
tion." This abrupt shifting from one mode of examination to another is likely to be
difficult to carry off and potentially puzzling to jurors.
39. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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The purpose of rule 612 is identical to that of the Jencks statute.40  It
permits the defense to test credibility and memory. The procedures outlined
in the statute have now been incorporated in rule 612.
Rule 613 outlines the foundation which must be laid in impeaching a
witness on the basis of a prior inconsistent statement. Subdivision (a) of
this rule rejects the requirement set forth in the antiquated Queen's Case41
that the witness must be shown the statement before he can be cross-
examined on it. Under subdivision (a) the statement need not be displayed
to the witness and counsel is not required to divulge its contents to him. On
request, however, the impeaching statement must be shown to opposing coun-
sel. Presumably this is to block -the use of falsely insinuating questions by
examining counsel. And under subdivision (b) of rule 613 an impeaching
writing must be shown to the witness before examining counsel can prove
the contents of the writing by extrinsic evidence. Contrary to past practice,
subdivision (b) does not require that this foundation be laid on cross-
examination in advance of use of the writing. The only requirement is the
generalized one that the witness be given a chance to explain or deny the
impeaching statement; the subdivision mentions no particular time sequence.
This would permit several collusive witnesses to be cross-examined prior to
disclosure of their joint inconsistent statement.
Rule 615 gives any litigant an absolute right to the exclusion from the
courtroom of most sorts of witnesses prior to their testimony.
Article VII: Opinions and Expert Testimony
The two-pronged test of opinion evidence by a nonexpert is (1) whether
it is rationally based on the witness' perception and (2) whether it is likely
to be helpful to the factfinder; so says rule 701. Rule 702 contains an ortho-
dox statement of the bases upon which expert testimony will be permitted.
The rule is broad and flexible: the fields of expertise are not limited to the
scientific but include every brand of specialized knowledge. A physicist is
an expert but so is a banker, a carpenter, an electrician, a sheet metal worker,
and so on down the long list of special skills. 42 The test again, as in rule
701, is basically usefulness to the factfinder.
Under rule 703 the bases of an expert's opinion need not themselves
be independently admissible if they are of a sort reasonably relied on by ex-
perts in the particular field (for example, a physician's reliance on X-rays
taken by a technician). Nothing in rule 703 suggests, however, that the
plainly inadmissible-such as a discredited testing method-is rendered
admissible simply because a supposed expert relied on it. Indeed, revelation
of his reliance on a discredited testing method would detract significantly
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
41. 2 Br. & B. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820).
42. See generally Waltz, The Uses of Non-Medical Expert information in Civil
Litigation, 48 Cm. B. REc. 15 (1966).
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from the weight of his testimony or, in an extreme case, lead to the striking
of it.
Rule 704 rejects the "ultimate issue" rule in connection with expert wit-
nesses. This does not mean that witnesses will now be allowed to give testi-
mony that amounts to nothing more than choosing up sides. "Did Clyde
Bushmat possess the capacity to make a will?" is not a good question; "The
defendant, in my opinion, was guilty of culpable conduct" is not a good re-
sponse. The safeguards are to be found in rules 701 and 702, both of which
insist that opinion testimony must be helpful to the factfinder, and in rule 403,
which empowers a trial judge to exclude evidence that constitutes a waste
of time.
Under rule 705 the bases of an expert's opinion need not be adduced
by examining counsel unless it is required by the trial judge. The major
change accomplished by rule 705 is elimination of the necessity of using a
hypothetical question in eliciting expert testimony. This is not to say that
rule 705 does away with the hypothetical question completely. It simply
does away with an absolute requirement that a hypothetical be put to the
expert. The use of the hypothetical question occasionally has its advantages
and it remains to be seen whether trial lawyers will accept with any frequency
this rule's invitation to forego its use. In any event, rule 705 probably fore-
closes successful assignments of error based on a claim that opposing counsel's
hypothetical question was incomplete, that is, failed to include all of the
underlying facts or data. In effect, rule 705 lodges with the cross-examiner
the burden of drawing out any missing data. And so the new rule should make
examining counsel less apprehensive about the use of hypothetical questions
since it is no longer essential to include every scrap of arguably pertinent data
on pain of a successful objection or of reversal.
Under rule 706 the trial court can appoint expert witnesses and can
reveal to the jury the fact of their appointment by him, thereby implying the
witness' neutrality and objectivity.
Article VIII: Hearsay
This is the lengthiest and far and away the most significant article of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. It is significant not simply because the rule
against hearsay evidence and all its pendant exceptions have long been either
the bane or the joy of litigators but because this article contains more innova-
tions (and, it can be suggested, more faulty drafting) than any other in the
new code. This article will not undertake an exhaustive analysis of article
VIII; however, the discussion will alert readers to some of the more signifi-
cant innovations to be found in the hearsay article.
Rule 801: Definitions
The first rule contained in article VIII is definitional. Rule 801(a)'s
definition of "statement" is important because of that word's use in subdivi-
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sion (c)'s definition of "hearsay" as being "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted. '43
Subdivision (a) recognizes three types of statements which are subject
to the hearsay rule as that rule is enunciated in subdivision (c): (1) a direct
oral assertion; (2) a direct written assertion; and (3) nonverbal conduct,
such as wordlessly pointing at a man in a police lineup with one's index
finger, which was intended as a direct assertion.
Statements of types (1) and (2) have been subject to the hearsay rule
ever since that rule emerged in English common law. It is subdivision (a)'s
description of type (3) that warrants discussion here. The effect of subdivi-
sion (a) is the exclusion of non-assertive conduct from the operation of the
hearsay rule; non-assertive conduct, which can be translated into a relevant
assertion, is not hearsay under the new Federal Rules of Evidence. This is
counter to the common law in a number of state jurisdictions. 44
As used in rule 801 (b), a "declarant" is a "person" who makes a "state-
ment" as that word is defined in subdivision (a). In other words, a "declar-
ant" is one who makes (1) an oral assertion; (2) a written assertion; or (3)
an assertion by means of nonverbal conduct, such as pointing or nodding
one's head.
Although the Advisory Committee said nothing on this score in its notes,
the word "person" was undoubtedly used advisedly, in order to avoid any
questions regarding so-called "non-human hearsay"-the parking meter
"said" his time had expired; the bloodhound who tracked him "said" this
is the killer; the radar equipment "said" the defendant was driving his auto-
mobile at eighty miles an hour. While evidence of this sort may have its
problems, the hearsay rule is not one of them. A bloodhound is not a "person"
-at least an unincorporated bloodhound isn't.
Rule 801(c)'s definition of "hearsay," taken alone-that is, without
incorporating the innovations embodied in subdivisions (a) and (d)-is
entirely orthodox. Testimony given during court proceedings is excluded
from the rule's reach since there is compliance with the ideal conditions for
testimony--oath, confrontation, right of cross-examination, ability of fact-
finder to observe demeanor, and so on.
43. FED. R. EvED. 801(c) (emphasis added).
44. At common law, nonassertive conduct has often been branded as hearsay. See
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L.
REV. 177, 214, 217 (1948). It has been treated as hearsay even though it frequently
is "great" evidence. It is often "great" evidence because, unlike many conscious asser-
tions, it does not seem to suffer significantly from the most important of the risks of
unreliability usually associated with hearsay evidence. Those risks have to do with the
out-of-court declarant's (or actor's) (1) perception; (2) memory; (3) veracity or sin-
cerity; and (4) ability to communicate what he/she means accurately and comprehen-
sibly. See J. WALTZ, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 62-67 (1975).
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The crucial test is whether the statement is offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted. If the statement is significant simply because it was
made (verbal act) or because the making of it has legal significance in and
of itself (legally operative fact), the statement is not being offered to prove
the truth of anything asserted. It is therefore not hearsay.
Subdivision (d)(1)(A) of rule 801 alters the common law. In times
past it had been thought that a witness' prior inconsistent statement was
admissible solely to impeach his credibility as a witness. It was not admis-
sible as substantive evidence; it could not, in other words, be used affirma-
tively to support some issue in the case. Since, under subdivision (d) (1) (A),
a prior inconsistent statement given under oath is not hearsay, it is admissible
to prove the truth of assertions contained in it and thus qualifies as substan-
tive evidence.
Rule 801's subdivision (d)(1)(B) conforms to the approach taken in
the preceding subdivision. Prior consistent statements have customarily been
receivable to rebut claims that the witness' testimony was a recent fabrication
or invention. Now such statements are admissible not only to rehabilitate
the witness but also as substantive evidence. (It may have been a drafting
error, but there seems quite clearly to be no requirement that the prior con-
sistent statement have been made under oath.)
Rule 801's subdivision (d)(2) provides that admissions made by a party
to the action are not subject to the operation of the hearsay rule, although
admissions of this sort have traditionally been considered hearsay and then
allowed in evidence under an important exception to the hearsay rule. It
should not be thought, however, that the difference between the common law
approach and that of this subdivision is merely semantical.
Rule 801(d)(2) sets out a number of categories of party admissions.
Most of them are reiterations of existing law. However, two of the categories
-(C) and (D)--effect changes in existing law.
Subdivision (d) (2) (C) goes beyond the common law as it exists in
some jurisdictions. If a principal authorizes his agent to make statements
to third persons, these statements can take on the characteristics of admis-
sions and are binding upon the principal. This subdivision is broader, how-
ever, and would make admissions made between two agents or between the
agent and the principle admissible evidence. The expansion discernible in sub-
division (d) (2) (C) is consistent with the fact that a party's books and
records are admissible against him regardless of whether disclosure to third
persons was ever intended.
Subdivision (d)(2)(D) goes beyond the usual agency test for determin-
ing whether the principal is bound by admissions made by an agent. In the
past the key question had been, "Was the agent acting within the scope of
his agency in making the admission?" Not many principals engage agents
for the purpose of making damaging admissions and so the usual result was
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exclusion of the agent's statements. Lately, the trend has been toward
admissibility. Subdivision (d)(2)(D) follows this trend: the statement
need only concern a matter within the scope of the declarant's employment.
It is thought that this relaxation of the traditional rule will facilitate the
admission of much reliable and illuminating evidence. The limitation that
the statement must have been made prior to the termination of the principal-
agent, master-servant relationship will protect the principal or employer from
statements made by unhappy former employees who later seek retribution
for having been discharged.
Subdivision (d) (2) (E), providing for the admission of a co-conspira-
tor's statement, is consistent with current federal practice. It adopts 'the Su-
preme Court's position in denying admissibility to statements made after the
conspiracy's objectives have either failed or been accomplished. 45
Rule 802: The Hearsay Rule
Rule 802 excludes all evidence that qualifies as hearsay under rule 801
unless it falls within an exception listed in rules 803 and 804, or is made ad-
missible by some other rule adopted by the Supreme Court or by federal
statute.
Rules 803 and 804: The Hearsay Exceptions
Instead of following the usual pattern of describing all of the traditional
hearsay exceptions in no particular order, article VIII presents two separate
catalogs of exceptions. Whether an exception falls into one list or the other
depends on whether the availability or unavailability of the out-of-court
declarant as a witness is deemed significant.
Rule 803 lists those exceptions, twenty-four in all, under which the
availability of the declarant to testify is immaterial. The hearsay statement
can be proved through another witness even though the declarant himself is
available to take the witness stand and testify.
Rule 804 lists five exceptions that come into play only when the out-
of-court declarant is unavailable to testify. Rule 804 defines the term
"unavailable" with some specificity.
Subdivision (1) of rule 803 sets out the first of twenty-four exceptions
under which the availability of the out-of-court declarant as a witness is of
no legal consequence. Exception (1), for present sense impressions,
involves a type of spontaneous but not necessarily excited4 6 utterance. The
idea is that the substantial contemporaneity of observed event and statement
preclude deliberate falsification. Furthermore, declarations of present sense
45. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
46. Rule 803(2) is an orthodox statement of the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule.
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impression are usually made in the presence of at least one other person, who
presumably would often be in a position to check any misstatement. Indeed,
this will probably be considered essential to any application of this ex-
ception. If, for example, a witness on the stand at trial offers to testify,
"My husband told me, 'Clyde Bushmat, whose voice I recognized, called me
just seconds ago on the telephone and offered me a bribe,'" the present sense
impression exception should not be considered applicable, if only because the
witness on the stand did not hear the alleged telephone conversation and thus
was not in a position to assess the accuracy of her husband's declaration that
the caller was in fact Bushmat and that Bushmat's words added up to the
offer of a bribe. This situation is quite different from the one encountered
in the case most often relied on in support of this exception, Houston
Oxygen Co. v. Davis,47 where an automobile driver commented, in the hear-
ing of two passengers, that the persons in a passing car "must have been
drunk, that we would find them somewhere on the road wrecked if they kept
that rate of speed up."'48 The passengers were in as good a position to
observe the passing car as was the declarant; they acted, as a consequence,
as a check on any misstatement by the declarant.
Rule 803(3), covering then existing mental, emotional, or physical
condition, actually embraces particularized applications of subdivision (1)
(present sense impression). It bundles together several specific types of
spontaneous declarations that in the past have usually been given separate
treatment in codes, treatises, and law school casebooks. Aside from this
merging process, however, subdivision (3) is in line with established
precedent.
Rule 803(4), to the extent that it excepts from the hearsay rule state-
ments of past and present symptomology to a treating physician, is consistent
with the rule applied even in those few states that refuse to recognize a gen-
eralized exception of the sort found in subdivision (3). Here it is thought
that the out-of-court declarant, who seeks accurate diagnosis and helpful
treatment, has a powerful motive for speaking truthfully.
Subdivision (4) contains one departure from conventional doctrine.
The usual rule has been that statements to a physician who has been con-
sulted solely for the purpose of enabling him to testify as an expert witness
are excluded from this type of hearsay exception. The witness could describe
what had been told him if it tended to support and explain his diagnosis but
the out-of-court declarations were said not to be substantive evidence in the
case. Calling on lay jurors to make this sort of distinction is unrealistic.
Accordingly, the distinction is deliberately abandoned in subdivision (4),
which is as applicable to statements to non-treating doctors as it is to those
made to treating doctors.
47. 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942).
48. Id. at 5, 161 S.W.2d at 476.
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A hearsay exception for past recollection recorded (which is to be
distinguished from the process of reviving or refreshing present recollection) 49
has long been recognized and can now be found in rule 803(5).
Rule 803(6), covering business records, was unorthodox in one respect
as it was first transmitted to Congress. Its pivotal phraseology was signifi-
cantly broader than that encountered in existing business records statutes in
that it referred not to a "business" but to any "regularly conducted activity."
This phraseology departed from that of the Federal Business Records Act.50
Presumably the draftsmen were seeking a phrase broad enough to encompass
occupations and callings that are not ordinarily thought of as businesses-
the work of a church, for example, and also the professions.
The House Judiciary Committee believed that there were insufficient
guarantees of reliability surrounding records that did not fall within tradi-
tional definitions of "business" records. By amendment the committee
inserted a definition of "business" that specifically included professions and
occupations and "callings of every kind."'" The House committee also added
language making it explicit that "it must have been the regular practice of
a business to make the record." 52
The Senate preferred the Court's version of subdivision (6) and
amended the House version to restore the phrase "regularly conducted
activity."' 58 However, the Senate-House conference committee restored the
word "business" and reinserted an expansive definition of "business."
Just as do most existing statutes, subdivision (6) eliminates the common
law requirement of calling or accounting for all participants in the making
of business records. The subdivision adopts the approach of the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act § 2 in providing that the requisite founda-
tion testimony can be supplied by "the custodian or other qualified witness."
In describing the various forms that a record may assume the drafters
included the expression "data compilation." This phraseology, drawn from
revised Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a), is flexible enough to include
electronic computer information storage.
Subdivision (7), having to do with the absence of an entry in business
records, will occasionally assist the trial lawyer who confronts the sometimes
difficult task of proving a negative.
Subdivision (8) covers public records and reports. It is in most respects
orthodox; public records, generally speaking, have long been subject to a
49. See rule 612 supra.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970). For that matter, it also departed from the phraseol-
ogy of the CAL. EvIo. CODE, §§ 1270-71 (West 1966), N.J.R. Evm. 63(13), MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 514 (1942), and UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE § 803(b).
51. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973).
52. Id.
53. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1974).
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hearsay exception. Of the three subsections of subdivision (8), only (C)
is likely to be controversial. It embraces so-called evaluative reports, such
as a report of the United States Bureau of Mines containing a conclusion as
to the cause of an explosion. 54 The truth is that a significant range of evalua-
tive reports are already admissible in evidence pursuant to various federal
statutes. 55 Subdivision (9), involving records of vital statistics, is typical of
such provisions.
Subdivision (10), pertaining to the absence of a public record or entry,
slightly overlaps subdivision (7). Just as rule 803(7) permits proof of the
nonoccurrence of an event by evidence of the nonexistence of a record that
would ordinarily be made of its occurrence during a regularly conducted
business activity, rule 803(10) permits this mode of proof in connection with
public records of the sort referred to in subdivisions (8) and (9).
Subdivisions (11) through (17) (records of religious organizations;
marriage and baptismal certificates; family records; records of documents
affecting interest in property; statements in documents affecting an interest
in property; ancient documents; market reports and commercial publications)
are, in the main, codifications of existing common law. Under rule 803(16)
a document is now "ancient" if it has been in existence for more than twenty
years. This may startle some practitioners and judges who, like the author
of this article, have been in existence for somewhat more than twenty years. 56
Rule 803(18), providing for the admission of "learned treatises" as
substantive evidence, and not simply for impeachment purposes, constitutes
a significant departure from the law in all but a handful of jurisdictions.
Some legal scholars have favored the admissibility of learned treatises as sub-
stantive evidence. Not all of them have.57 Almost none of the decided cases
have allowed this approach, holding the hearsay rule applicable and often
predicting, additionally, a likelihood that a treatise, or portions of one taken
out of context, would be misunderstood and misapplied by lay factfinders. 5a
The minority of courts and writers favoring substantive admission have
54. See McCormick, Can the Courts Make Wider Use of Reports of Official In-
vestigations?, 42 IowA L. REv. 363 (1957), for a discussion of such reports.
55. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 79(d) (1970) (Secretary of Agriculture's findings prima facie
evidence of true grade of grain); 18 U.S.C. § 4245 (1970) (Director of Prisons' certifi-
cate that convict has been examined and found probably incompetent at time of trial
prima facie evidence in court hearing on competency).
56. The old rule was that any document over thirty years of age was "ancient,"
a circumstance duly noted by the sort of law student, rampant in the late sixties and
early seventies, who insisted that anyone over thirty was not to be believed. It gives
one a certain satisfaction to be able to point out that, under the new Federal Rules of
Evidence at least, anything over twenty is "ancient."
57. E.g. J. WALTz & F. INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 85-87 (1971).
58. E.g., Rice v. Clement, 184 So. 2d 678 (Fla. App. 1966); Koury v. Folio, 271
N.C. 732, 157 S.E.2d 548 (1968). See also J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1690 (3d ed.
1940).
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thought that powerful guarantees of reliability surrounded learned treatises"9
since, as the Advisory Committee put it, ,they are "written primarily and
impartially for professionals, subject to scrutiny and exposure for inaccuracy,
with the reputation of the writer at stake."6 °
The drafters of subdivision (18) expressed a belief that "The rule avoids
the danger of misunderstanding and misapplication by limiting the use of
treatises as substantive evidence to situations in which an expert is on the
stand and available to explain and assist in the application of the treatise if
desired." 61 There are those who will suggest an element of naivet6 in the
Committee's expectation than an expert witness' testimony will invariably
render learned treatises crystal clear to laymen. But the drafters are clearly
correct in their added suggestion that some potential for confusion may be
avoided by the subdivision's proscription against receiving the learned pub-
lication physically in evidence and sending it to the jurors' deliberation room.
The requirement that there be an expert witness on the stand may
reduce the value of subdivision (18) to plaintiffs in those sorts of cases-
medical malpractice cases, for example-in which claimants have experi-
enced difficulty securing favorable expert testimony. As drafted, subdivision
(18) does not mean that a medical malpractice plaintiff can now rely exclu-
sively on medical literature to make out a prima facie case for liability; the
asserted "conspiracy of silence" on the part of medical experts is not so easily
surmounted. Introduction of medical literature by the malpractice plaintiff
may be blocked if the plaintiff cannot secure an expert medical witness to
place on the stand at trial to "sponsor" the proferred items of literature. Of
course, it may prove easier for plaintiffs to obtain expert witnesses where the
only testimony expected of them is to the effect that particular items of lit-
erature constitute "reliable authority." It may also be that a malpractice
plaintiff can occasionally solve this problem by calling the defendant
physician to the stand "as on cross-examination.
6 2
Subdivision (18) does not require that the opposing party's expert
witness rely on or even recognize the publication as being authoritative. In
this way the subdivision avoids the possibility that the expert might block
cross-examination by refusing to admit either reliance or authoritativeness.
(Of course, the authoritative nature of the publication must be established
by some means-for example, testimony by another expert or, occasionally
perhaps, judicial notice.)
59. E.g., Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558 (1857); Stone v. Proctor, 259
N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d 297 (1963).
60. Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 194, 316 (1972). The source of the Com-
mittee's intelligence that all treatises are written "impartially" goes undisclosed.
61. Id.
62. But it should be observed that nowhere do the Federal Rules of Evidence pro-
vide, in so many terms, for calling an adverse witness "as on cross-examination." And
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(b), which did so provide, is abrogated by the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
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Since the treatise or other form of publication is made admissible as
substantive evidence, and is no longer usable only as an impeachment tool,
trial judges need no longer devise instructions aimed at getting the jury to
draw this distinction.
Subdivisions (19), (20) and (21) (reputations concerning personal or
family history, boundaries, or general history, and reputation as to character)
are relatively unimportant and reflect no radical shifts from prior practice.
Rule 803(22) deals with judgments of previous felony convictions.
American courts have taken three different approaches to the admissibility
in a later civil action of a prior criminal conviction as evidence of facts essen-
tial to the conviction. The majority rule has been that a criminal conviction
cannot be introduced in a later civil action. 63 This rigid rule has been under-
going some erosion, however. Thus some jurisdictions will receive previous
convictions for whatever they may be worth, that is, as prima facie evi-
dence of the existence of the facts involved in the criminal case.64 And some
courts will admit prior criminal convictions as conclusive of the facts under-
lying them. 65 Rule 803(22) adopts the second approach. Convictions of
minor offenses and judgments based on pleas of nolo contendere are
excluded from the subdivision's operation.
Subdivision (23) sets up a hearsay exception for previous judgments
concerning facts which would also be provable by reputation evidence.
There have been only four reported cases dealing with this exception. 66
Rule 803(24) is a residual or catchall for what might be termed "great"
hearsay that just misses treatment under one of the traditional hearsay excep-
tions. Under the final version of subdivision (24) a hearsay statement not
falling within one of the specific exceptions will nonetheless be admissible
if (1) the out-of-court declaration appears to have "equivalent circumstan-
tial guarantees of trustworthiness," (2) is offered as evidence of a material
fact, (3) "is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts,"
and (4) the trial court has determined that "the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the state-
ment into evidence." And there is a notice provision which it can be safely
predicted will from time to time be unworkable.
63. E.g., Cammarano v. Gimino, 234 Ill. App. 556 (1924).
64. See, e.g., New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 117 F.2d
404 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 580 (1941).
65. E.g., Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E.
314 (1927).
66. Grant Bros. Construction Co. v. United States, 232 U.S. 647 (1914) (pedi-
gree); Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 550 (1848) (prior judgment of legitimacy
admissible as prima facie evidence in later civil suit); Jung Yen Loy v. Cahill, 81 F.2d
809 (9th Cir. 1936) (citizenship); United States v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 67
F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1933) (pedigree).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
While controversial, this residual exception is not likely to be dramati-
cally significant. The preconditions are onerous but beyond that, it is quite
difficult to think of many trustworthy types of hearsay that are not already
adequately covered by the traditional exceptions to the rule against hearsay.
Rule 804 collects five hearsay exceptions under which the unavailability
of the out-of-court declarant is made a condition of the admissibility of the
hearsay declaration. Rule 804(a) catalogs five grounds of unavailability,
ranging from ,the ultimate unavailability, death, to the successful invocation
of a testimonial privilege.
Rule 804(b)(1) sets up an exception covering previously recorded testi-
mony. It is a fairly typical statement of this longstanding exception.
Subdivision (b)(2) perpetuates the dying declaration exception, once
restricted to homicide cases, and extends it to civil actions, although not to
lesser criminal cases. The expansion of this exception to include civil actions
is a significant one, especially in wrongful death cases, and may from time
to time inspire forum-shopping.
Rule 804(b)(3) is the declaration against interest exception. It
reflects a departure from the traditional form of this exception in that declara-
tions tending to subject the speaker to civil or criminal liability, or to negate
a claim by him against another, are included.
Rule 804(b)(4) deals in orthodox fashion with the familiar hearsay
exception for out-of-court declarations concerning family history: birth,
death, divorce, and so on. Some restrictive foundation requirements have
been dropped. 67
Rule 804(b)(5)'s wording is identical to that of rule 803(24), the
residual exception. It serves no useful purpose.
Rule 805: Hearsay-Within-Hearsay
Rule 805 declares that the rule against hearsay does not require the
rejection of a hearsay statement which includes a further hearsay statement
(hearsay-within-hearsay or "totem pole hearsay") when bath statements con-
form to the requirements of some hearsay exception. 68
67. E.g., under (B) the subdivision deals with out-of-court declarations relating to
the history of another person. The declarant is qualified under this subdivision if he
was related to the other person by blood or marriage. Contrary to the common law,
the declarant also qualifies as a consequence of intimate association with the other per-
son's family. The subdivision contains no requirement, contrary to some of the cases,
that the declarant must qualify as to both persons where the subject of the out-of-court
declaration is the relationship between two persons other than the declarant.
68. This codifies the approach suggested in such cases as Yates v. Bair Transport,
Inc., 249 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), and Kelly v. Wasserman, 5 N.Y.2d 425, 158
N.E.2d 241, 185 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1959).
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Rule 806: Impeaching the Out-of-Court Declarant
Rule 806 liberalizes existing law relating to the impeachment of out-
of-court declarants. When a hearsay statement or an 801(d)(2)(C), (D)
or (E) nonhearsay statement is received in evidence to prove the truth of
its assertions it is as though the out-of-court declarant were a witness-a wit-
ness who is "testifying" from beyond the courtroom through a witness on the
stand who acts as a conduit. It is the credibility of the out-of-court declarant
that matters. Consequently, it is only fair to permit the party against whom
the out-of-court declaration is offered to attack the absent declarant's credi-
bility (and then the proponent can seek to rehabilitate the declarant) in the
ways permitted under such rules as 608 (Evidence of Character and Conduct
of Witness), 609 (Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime), and
613 (Prior Statements of Witness).
There are, however, some peculiar problems attending -the use of an
out-of-court declarant's inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes.
These problems stem from the almost inevitable differences between the use
of an in-court witness and the use of out-of-court declarations.
In the case of an in-court witness the inconsistent statement will
undoubtedly be a prior statement; it is therefore entirely feasible to call the
statement to -the witness' attention and let him explain it if he can. On the
other hand, in the case of an out-of-court declaration the declarant's incon-
sistent statement may very well be a subsequent one, and this precludes call-
ing the declarant's attention to it. If this impossible foundation requirement
were enforced, the opponent of the out-of-court declaration, already deprived
of any opportunity for cross-examination, would be denied another important
impeachment technique. The drafters of rule 806 followed the current trend
and gave the factfinder ,the widest opportunity for assessing the trustworthi-
ness of an out-of-court declaration by accepting any inconsistent statement,
regardless of when made, and dispensing with any foundation requirement.
Article IX: Authentication and Identification
The requirement that tangible evidence be authenticated or identified
is satisfied, under rule 901, by the production of evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding that the evidence is what its proponent asserts it is. Rule 901
supplies some examples of authenticating evidence: (1) the testimony of a
witness with direct knowledge, such as a person who observed the signing
of a document; (2) nonexpert handwriting opinion; (3) handwriting com-
parison by the factfinder; (4) evidence of distinctive characteristics, such as
content suggesting that a letter was in reply to an authenticated letter; (5)
voice identification by one familiar with it; (6) telephone calls placed in reli-
ance on an assigned number; (7) evidence that a writing is an official record
or report; (8) ancient documents; (9) evidence describing a process or sys-
tem which -tends to show that it produces an accurate result; and (10)
methods of authentication provided by statute or rule.
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Rule 902 recognizes various presumptions of authenticity for, among
other items, certified copies of public records, official publications, news-
papers and periodicals, trade inscriptions, and commercial paper.
Article X: Contents of Writings, Recordings, and Photographs
Rule 1002 sets forth all that remains of the so-called "best evidence"
rule relating to writings, recordings, and photographs. Under the preceding
rule, 1001, computer printouts and photographic prints are deemed "origi-
nals" within the meaning of the "best evidence" rule, which simply expresses a
preference for originals. The most significant forward movement to be found
in article X is in rule 1003, under which duplicates are admissible as
originals unless a genuine question of the original's authenticity arises or for
some reason fairness requires production of the original. The term "dupli-
cate" is defined in rule 1001(4) in such a way as to virtually eliminate
the possibility of error in the making of duplicates.
Rule 1005 exempts public records from rule 1002's version of the "best
evidence" rule, since their removal from proper custody for extended periods
of time is not feasible.
Rule 1006 deals in customary fashion with the use of summary
witnesses, who reduce the contents of voluminous writings to a chart, calcula-
tion, or summary. Rule 1007 provides that the contents of writings and the
like can be authenticated by the testimonial or written admission of the party
against whom it is being offered, in which event there need be no accounting
for failure to produce the original.
Article XI: Miscellaneous Rules
Rule 1101 describes in detail the courts, proceedings, questions, and
stages of proceedings to which the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in whole
or in part. Rule 1102 sets forth the way in which future amendments to
the Rules are to be accomplished.
CONCLUSION
In dissenting from the Supreme Court's November 20, 1972, order
promulgating the Federal Rules of Evidence, former Justice William 0. Doug-
las remarked on the fact that -the Advisory Committee, and not the Court, had
written the Rules. He declared that the Court was "merely the conduit to
Congress." 69 And Mr. Justice Douglas thought that the Court probably
lacked the expertise to be much more than a conduit. "We are so far
removed from the trial arena," he said, "that we have no special insight, no
meaningful oversight to contribute. ' 70 He thought that the Proposed Rules
69. Order, 56 F.R.D. 184, 185 (1972).
70. Id.
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should be channeled through the federal Judicial Conference, "whose mem-
bers are much more qualified than we to appraise their merits when applied
in actual practice."''7
Instead of being circulated to the Judicial Conference, the Rules were
sent across to a Congress that was soon to be embroiled in the agonizing issues
raised by the scandals of the Nixon Administration, including the possible
impeachment of the President. Despite these distractions, committees of
both Houses set about the amendatory process with gusto. Not surprisingly,
their efforts were hasty and sometimes haphazard.
The products of congressional ineptitude in attempting to redraft rule
formulations that had been some eight years in the making can be cured by
amendment 72 and judicial gloss. Meanwhile, the new Rules provide a basic,
and basically sound, evidentiary framework for the federal practice.
71. Id. at 185-86.
72. One such amendment, embodied in S. 1549, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), is
already in the legislative hopper. It is aimed at restoring to rule 801 a subdivision (d)
(1)(C) which would exempt from the hearsay rule statements "of identification of a
person made after perceiving him." This provision, which has strong Justice Depart-
ment backing and is likely to pass both Houses of Congress and receive presidential ap-
proval, is tailored to fit police lineup identifications.
